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ETHICS AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Robert S. Stevens*
It is probably a prevailing practice automatically to plead the Statute
of Limitations to a stale claim and the Statute of Frauds when there is
known to be no writing signed by the defendant, or his agent, evidencing
the contract sued upon. The statutes are there, they supply the defenses,
and the attorney would not be giving full and competent service to his
client if he did not advise him of them and advance them for him.
But there are occasions when the lawyer rebels at pleading the Statute
of Limitations or when, if peculiar circumstances seem to require it, he
resorts to the statute with explanations and apologies to his adversary.
Conscious that the Statute of Limitations enacts a rule of procedure
rather than of substantive law, that it is aimed at prohibiting the prose-
cution of alleged claims which can not be disproved because of the loss
of witnesses or documentary evidence, and that, with this purpose in
mind, the periods of limitation for various types of litigation have been
rather arbitrarily classified and fixed, the lawyer may feel that it would
be shabby to permit the client to plead the statute and thereby escape
performance of a just obligation. Suppose, for example, that the suit is
upon a promissory note. The client has received the benefit of the loan.
The memories of the parties are clear as to the transaction. The existence
of the debt could not be denied under oath. The documentary evidence
of it is at hand. The six year limitation expired two days before suit was
brought. The client, though now affluent, is prepared to take advantage
of the indulgence extended him during his intervening hard times and
hopes to defeat enforcement of a just obligation by pleading the statute.
What lawyer wants to be or should be a party to such perversion of the
spirit and purpose of the Statute of Limitations?
There is a similar problem of ethics in connection with the use of the
Statute of Frauds as a defense. But here, the lawyer's conscience may
be in conflict, not merely with a custom of the profession habitually to
plead the defense, as in the case of the Statute of Limitations, but with
judge-made law, that is all but unanimously adopted, to the effect that
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 439, for biographical data.
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the defendant can admit an honest obligation and yet defeat its enforce-
ment by pleading that the agreement was only oral and that there is no
written evidence of the obligation as required by the Statute of Frauds.
In the conflict between conscience and judically approved practice, what
is the lawyer to do? Conscience tells him that the practice is wrong, but
the literature from insurance companies reminds him of liability for
malpractice.
The remedy seems to lie in changing the law so that it will conform
with conscience and morals. Justice Cardozo has reminded us that
"Hardly a rule of today but may be matched by its opposite of yester-
day."1 That statement has not only aptness, but cogent persuasiveness
in connection with our consideration of this conflict between morals and
law. For there was a time, and it is hoped that it may recur, when the
law was that if a defendant admitted the making of an oral agreement,
he could not escape that honorable obligation by pleading the Statute
of Frauds.
It seems strange that upon a point of law of such importance to both
the profession and the public, there should be so little published con-
sideration outside of judicial opinions. As lawyers, we are accustomed
to what we find in the latter. In the opinions of courts that are making
new law or changing old law, we find spirited discussions. But then there
may follow an age of lassitude, when an announced view is indifferently
perpetuated and a respect for a time-tested rule provides a substitute
for an inquiry into the origin of that rule or a consideration of the con-
tinuance of its workability and propriety. Such, it is submitted, has, on
the whole, been the history of the rule we are now considering. A very
few judicial voices have expressed dissent in the past few years from
the accepted rule: These will be emphasized presently. But first, let us
concentrate upon the overwhelmingly accepted view.
Browne on the Statute of Frauds states:
But by the unbroken course of more modern decisions, it is now well
settled that although the defendant admits the agreement, it cannot be
-enforced without the production of a written memorandum, if he insist
upon the bar of the statute.2
This, a quotation from Story's Equity Pleadings,3 and similar con-
I CARDozo, Tns NATURE OF THE JuDICiAL PROCESS 26 (1921).
2 BRoWNE, STATUTE Or FRAUDS § 515 (5th ed. 1895). To the same effect see 2 REED,
STATUTE OF FRAUDS J§ 526 and 537 (1884). Rabel, The Statute of Frauds and Compara-
tive Legal History, 63 L. Q. Rv. 174, 187 (1947): "English and American businessmen
widely ignore the Statute of Frauds. Honest parties to a suit resort to it only as an
auxiliary defense against an unjust action"
3 SToRY, EQuITY PLEADINGS § 765 (10th ed. 1892).
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clusions as to the existing law found in cyclopedias, are often cited
without more, to support decisions continuing the rule. But, supple-
menting the repetition of these familiar generalizations as to what the
law is, courts at times have advanced particular arguments or theories.
It is profitable to examine some of these.'
One theory is that, though the required memorandum does not have
to be executed contemporaneously with the negotiations leading to the
oral agreement, still a memorandum signed after action brought does
not fulfil the statutory requirement. It will be recalled that the con-
sequences of the absence of written evidence of the contract are dif-
ferently stated in the several sections of the English statute. Thus, under
Section 7, "all declarations or creations of trusts ... shall be manifested
and proved by some writing ... or else they shall be void and of none
effect." Under Section 17, "no contract for the sale of any goods ...
shall be allowed to be good" unless the buyer shall accept delivery of
part, make part payment or sign a memorandum. In contrast, Section 4
concerning contracts of guaranty, contracts in consideration of mar-
riage, contracts for the sale of land, etc., reads "no action shall be
brought" unless there shall be a signed agreement or memorandum
thereof.
In 1841, in an action upon an oral contract for the sale of goods where
the defendant had executed a memorandum of the agreement after
action was brought, one English court held that the plaintiff could not
recover in spite of the subsequent memorandum.' Baron Parke said:
With regard to the point which has been made by Mr. Martin, that a
memorandum in writing after action brought is sufficient, it is certainly
quite a new point, but I am clearly of the opinion that it is untenable.
There must, In order to sustain the action, be a good contract in existence
at the time of action brought; and to make it a good contract under the
statute, there must be one of the three requisites mentioned. I think, there-
fore, that a written memorandum, or part payment, after action brought
is not sufficient to satisfy the statute.7
To the same effect is Lucas v. Dixoni8 another suit upon an oral con-
tract for the sale of goods in which, after action brought, the defendant
had executed an affidavit which was sufficient to constitute a memo-
randum if admissible. It was held inadmissible. The court starts with
4 49 Amr. JUR., fit. Statute of Frauds, § 605; 37 C.J.S., fit. Frauds, Statute of, § 265(b).
5 The American decisions will be found collected in the volumes cited in note 4 supra
and in 49 L.RA. (N.s.) 27 (1914) and 22 AJ.R. 723 (1922).
6 Bill v. Bament, 9 M. & W. 36 (1841).
7 Id. at 40-41. Cf. Fricker v. Thomlinson, 1 Man. & G. 722 (1840), where the effect
of acceptance of delivery in part after action brought was discussed but not decided.
8 L.R. 22 Q.B. 357 (1889).
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the assumption that it has been settled that, in actions falling under
Section 4, the memorandum must exist at the time the action is com-
menced.9 If that be true, the court found no reason why the rule should
be different in an action under Section 17. It is interesting that both
Lord Esher and Lord Bowen, in the process of construing Section 17,
refer to the three requirements of the statute: 1) acceptance of delivery
in part, 2) payment in part or 3) a signed memorandum, and conclude
that it is so highly unlikely that a defendant disputing the contract
would, after action brought, accept part of the goods or make part pay-
ment, that it must be supposed that the legislature intended that these
acts and the signing of a memorandum must have preceded the com-
mencement of the action.
The critical importance of the word "void" was insisted upon in a
Wisconsin decision.'0 The statute of that state, like those of some others,
in the provision relating to contracts for the sale of real property, sub-
stitutes "void" for "no action shall be brought."
The court said:
A contract declared void by statute, is in all respects a nullity. It cannot
for any purpose be considered as ever having had a being or existence.
Excepting the single case reserved from its operation [part performance in
equity], all verbal contracts for the sale of land or any interest in them,
are under our statute, as if no words had ever been spoken concerning
them, and no negotiations whatever had been had between the parties;
and I confess my utter inability to perceive how, upon any acknowledged
principle of jurisprudence, they can be treated for any purpose as ever
having been made at all . . . In this view, it makes no difference whether
the original bargain was for a clear title or only a warranty deed. It
makes no difference whether the plaintiff acted in good faith or in bad
faith in abandoning his first form of action, in which he insisted upon a
conveyance, and in changing it, by amendment, into a suit to recover back
the money which he had paid. Nor is the demand for such relief aided by
the consideration that the parol contract is definitely stated and admitted
in the pleadings of both parties, and the statute not urged as a bar; ...
All these and other like considerations, which might be very properly
urged before a court sitting to adjudicate upon the rights of parties under
a statute like the English, can be of no avail here. The simple answer to
them is, that while under the English and other similar statutes, there is
a legal contract-one which the party is morally and conscientiously bound
to perform-under ours there Is none-nothing which creates any right
or imposes any obligation or duty whatever; and that all that the parties
may say or do, short of reducing their agreement to writing, expressing
the consideration, and causing it to be subscribed by the party making
9 For this, it seems to rely upon Wood v. Midgley, 5 De G. M. & G. 41 (1854), where
it was held that defendant can raise the Statute of Frauds by demurrer. Inferentially,
the admission implicit in the demurrer could not be availed of by plaintiff.
10 Brandeis v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 158 (1862).
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the sale, affords the court no solid ground, or colorable pretext even, for
noticing it or knowing that any thing of the kind has ever transpired."
Continuing its distinction, the court suggests that under a statute con-
taining the "no action" clause and intended to affect only the remedy
or the evidence,
There is some plausibility in the argument that it is designed to guard
against the frauds and perjuries occasioned by the free admission of parol
evidence, and that where the contract is confessed in the answer or other
pleading of the defendant or party to be charged, the danger is removed;
that the confession dispenses with the necessity of parol or other proof,
and takes away the temptation to commit either, and makes a case not
within the mischief which the legislature intended to obviate . . . How-
ever sound this reasoning, which has met with strong disapprobation on
the part of some of the greatest masters of the English and American
equity system, may be conceded to be, it dearly has no application to a
statute like ours. 2
The rule that defendant can, in his answer, admit the contract and
plead the statute is consistent with a rule that any confession, to be
admissible in evidence, must have antedated the commencement of
action. But it is submitted that both rules make bad law and that neither
reflects a true interpretation of legislative intent, whether the construc-
tion is of "void," "shall be allowed to be good" or "no action shall be
brought." Each of these is conditioned by the purpose of Statutes of
Frauds, as stated in the title and the preamble of the Statute of Charles
II, "An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries"-.."for the preven-
tion of many fraudulent practices which are commonly endeavored to
be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury."
Upon this point, it is significant to quote Browne on the Statute of
Frauds which, as previously stated, adheres to the doctrine that a de-
fendant's answer can both admit the agreement and plead the statute.
At the outset, we note the difference in phraseology between the fourth
and the seventeenth sections, in this, that the former says 'no action shall
be brought' upon the contract, and the latter says the contract shall not
be 'allowed to be good.' There seems to be no reason to attribute to the
latter phraseology any force, or to draw from it any inferences, different
from those which attend the construction of the former. 'Allowed to be
good' appears to mean, considered good for the purposes of recovery upon
it; 13 and the remaining portions of the two sections in question being very
similar, and the policy of the two being very clearly the same, we should
11 Id. at 166-167.
12 Id. at 168. The rule that a defendant may admit the agreement and yet plead the
statute is said, by way pf dictum, to be particularly applicable and to carry ouJ the
intent of statutes using "void": Luckett v. Williamson, 37 Mo. 388 (1866); Thomas J.
Baird Investment Co. v. Harris, 209 Fed. 291 (8th Cir. 1913).
13 The author cites Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325, 334 (1875).
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not be justified in laying much stress upon the change of phrase. The
whole statute is undeniably put together most irregularly and loosely...
The operation then, which the statute has upon a contract covered by it, is
that no enforcement of the contract can be had, while the requirements of
the statute remain unsatisfied, if the party against whom enforcement is
sought chooses to insist upon this defense; the statute does not make the
contract illegal; a contract which was legal and actionable before the
statute is legal since and notwithstanding the statute, and is also action-
able and enforceable if the making of the contract be followed by com-
pliance with the requirements of the statute. Compliance With the require-
ments of the statute does not constitute the contract; the statute presup-
poses an existing lawful contract, the enforcement of which is suspended
till the statute is satisfied.
14
All lawyers are aware of the decisions interpreting Statutes of Frauds
which are inconsistent with the literal meaning of "void" as used there.
It would take too long to enumerate, document and discuss them. Many
examples will be found in the chapter from Browne cited above. 5 Con-
trary to what was said by the Wisconsin court in the quotation already
given, 6 it is universally settled that a defendant may waive the defense
of the statute. If, as the Wisconsin court said, contracts within the
statute cannot "be treated for any purpose as ever having been made at
all," then, a memorandum subsequently signed would evidence some-
thing that is legally nothing. Yet, it is everywhere agreed that a memo-
randum executed after the agreement, and at least before action brought,
does not create a contract, but only supplies evidence of one previously
made orally.
Undeniably, the purpose of the statute was to give assured protection
against the risk, which experience had shown to be real, of convincing
proof through perjured testimony of an agreement that had never ac-
tually been entered into. The decisions and texts are replete with the
statement that the statute was intended to be used as a shield, not a
sword. Judicial construction of the statute prohibits its use as a defense
where the defendant has fraudulently prevented an actual agreement
from being reduced to writing or when acts of part performance une-
quivocally indicate the existence of a contract. Yet, judicial construc-
tion, starting more than one hundred years after the passage of the
original act, reversed the pre-existing decisional law and sanctioned the
use of the statute as a defense even though the defendant admitted the
agreement in his answer. Is this not permitting the statute to be used
as a sword? Perhaps, as Lord Esher and Lord Bowen said,'7 it is highly
14 BROWNE, STATuTE OF FRAuDs c. VIII, § 115, lSa (Sth ed. 1895).
15 See note 14 supra.
16 See note 10 sutpra.
17 See note 8 supra.
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unlikely that a defendant who genuinely disputes the making of an oral
agreement would, after action brought, accept partial delivery, make
part payment or sign a memorandum. But in Bill v. Bament'8 and in
Lucas v. Dixon,9 the unlikely happened-the defendant did execute a
memorandum after action begun; and in Fricker v. Thomlinson,20 he
did thereafter accept delivery in part. Under those circumstances, it is
difficult to concede the genuineness of the defendant's dispute of the
existence of the agreement or his need for protection against perjured
proof of a non-existent agreement.
Most important and revealing in connection with our immediate prob-
lem as to why one may admit the making of an oral agreement and yet
defeat its enforcement by pleading the statute, is the history of the
evolution of the present-day majority rule to this effect. So often, the
fact is overlooked that a rule was once just the opposite of what it is.
Many times history could be turned back to advantage.
In Leake v. Morris,2 decided in 1682, the suit was upon a contract
with an allegation in the bill that it was agreed that the agreement should
be put into writing. The defendant "pleaded the statute of frauds and
perjuries, for that, if any such agreement was made, it was by parol."Im
It was ordered that the "defendant do answer so much of the plaintiff's
bill only, as doth charge that the said agreement was to be put into
writing."'
Other early pronouncements on our subject are found in Croyston v.
Baynes24 in 1702 and, Symondson v. Tweed' in 1713. In the first of
these, it is reported:
In this case the Master of the Rolls declared that if a bill be brought
here for execution of a parol agreement, which is in no part executed, if
the defendant does by answer confess the agreement without insisting upon
the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries, the court will decree an execution of
the agreement because when the defendant confesses it, there is no danger
of perjury, which was the only thing the statute was intended to prevent.26
True, this is an indecisive statement for it is concededly open to the
inference that the defendant could confess and still claim the protection
of the statute. But to allow him to confess and defend would be incon-
18 9 M. & W. 36 (1841).
19 L.R. 22 Q.B. 357 (1889).
20 1 Man. & G. 722 (1840).
21 1 Dickens 14 (Ch. 1682).
22 Id. at 15.
23 Ibid.
24 Precedents in Chancery 208 (Ch. 1733).
2S Id. at 374. "
26 See note 24 supra.
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sistent with the court's conception of the single purpose of the statute.
Inconsistent with that single purpose and with any construction that
may be put upon the court's language, are those more modern decisions
already referred to, which hold that an oral contract may not be proved
by a memorandum signed after action brought.
The report of Symondson v. Tweed is:
In this case the Court declared, and the Council agreed likewise, that if
a man brings a bill for specific performance of a parol agreement, setting
forth the substance of it in a bill, and the defendant by his answer con-
fesses the agreement, that the Court may in such case decree an execution
thereof, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries, because the
defendant confessing the agreement, there can be no danger of perjury
from contrariety of evidence, which was the only michief that statute in-
tended to obviate.27
This declaration, however, is dictum because the defendant had not
by his answer admitted the alleged agreement. But that it represented
the view then prevailing is reflected in a Treatise of Equity printed in
1737, where it is said:
If an Agreement be by Parol, and not signed by the Parties, or some
Body lawfully authoriz'd by them, if such Agreement is not confess'd in
the Answer, it cannot be carried into execution. But where in his Answer,
he allows the bargain to be compleat, and does not insist on any Fraud,
there can be no Danger of Perjury; because he himself had taken away
the necessity of proving it. 2S
The leading and most cited early case is Child v. Godolphin,29 decided
by Lord Macclesfield in 1732. This was an action for specific perform-
ance of an agreement to assign a lease, the bill alleging a letter confirm-
ing the agreement signed by the defendant. The defendant, for his
defense, pleaded the statute, insisting that neither she nor any agent of
hers had ever signed any agreement or memorandum of an agreement to
assign the lease to the plaintiff, nor did she remember that she or any
agent of hers had ever signed any such memorandum except the letter
mentioned in the bill, which she was induced to sign believing it to be a
letter of recommendation. The defendant argued that the plea was suf-
ficient without an answer, for otherwise theplaintiff might produce wit-
nesses to prove the pretended agreement and the defendant would then
be deprived of the benefit of the statute. From an order that the plea
27 Precedents in Chancery 374 (Ch. 1733).
28 A TREATisE oF EQuTy printed by E. and R. Nutt and R. Gosling for D. Browne
in 1737, bk. 1, c. III, § 8, p. 19.
29 I Dickens 39 (Ch. 1723).
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should stand for an answer, defendant appealed. In affirming that order,
it is reported that
His Lordship said, the plea insisting on the statute was proper, but then
the defendant ought by answer to deny the agreement; for if she con-
fessed the agreement, the Court would decree a performance notwithstand-
ing the statute, for such confession would not be looked upon as perjury,
or intended to be prevented by the statute.30 (Emphasis added.)
Again in 1726, a plea without an answer was held insufficient. The
defendant, having been employed by the plaintiff to purchase certain
property, took conveyance in his own name and then, to prevent the
plaintiff from getting the property, reconveyed to the vendor. It was
ordered that the plea stand for an answer.31
The language of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in Cottington v. Flet-
cher,32 decided in 1740, is unequivocal upon the effect to be given de-
fendant's admission in his answer, notwithstanding his plea of the
statute. Plaintiff sued for a conveyance of property which he had con-
veyed to defendant, alleging that the transfer was only in trust for him-
self. To this bill, the defendant pleaded the statute and said that there
was no declaration of trust in writing. By his answer, he admitted the
assignment for the purpose charged in the bill. The Lord Chancellor
said:
I am of opinion that the plea ought to be overruled. Undoubtedly if the
plea stood by itself, it might have been a sufficient plea; but coupled with
the answer, which is a full admission of the facts, it must overrule the
plea.3
3
30 Id. at 42.
31 Rastel v. Hutchinson, 1 Dickens 44 (Ch. 1726).
32 2 Atk. 156, 26 Eng. Rep. 498 (Ch. 1740).
33 Ibid. The report states that defendant in his answer, after admitting the assignment,
stated "that he never intended to take any benefit to himself, otherwise than in presenting
the other defendant Mr. Loggin to the church upon the next avoidance, for that he was
recommended by Mr. Loggin to the plaintiff as a proper person for a grantee, and that
he did not know the plaintiff above a month before the grant." Ibid. Lord Hardwicke
adds to the opinion quoted above: "If the admission and confession by the answer amounts
to an admission and confession of a trust for the defendant Loggin as to the first avoid-
ance, the consequence of this is a resulting trust for the plaintiff after the presentment
to Loggin is performed. And this is the case -upon the statute of frauds and perjuries,
where the admission of an express trust to one person is likewise the admission of a
resulting trust to another." Ibid. The decision, therefore, seems to be made dependent
upon the admission in the defendant's answer. However, fifty-eight years later, Lord
Chancellor Loughborough, in Moore v. Edwards, 4 Ves. 23 (Ch. 1798), in answer to
counsel's argument that it had been settled that the statute cannot be insisted upon if
defendant's answer admits the agreement, said "That is a matter of argument. I know it
has been said in several cases. I do not take it to have been decided. I take it that
position has often been controverted. There is a case in Atkyns that misleads people;
where Lord Hardwicke is stated to have overruled the defense upon the statute merely
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Nine years later, in Attorney General v. Day, 4 Lord Hardwicke made
statements which, though dicta, reaffirmed his views as to what the law
then was:
Yet on all the questions on that statute in this court, the end and pur-
port of making it has been considered, viz. to prevent frauds and per-
juries: so that any agreement, in which there is no danger of either, the
court has considered as out of the statute; upon which there have been
many cases: as in a bill by purchaser of lands against the vendor, to carry
into execution the agreement, though not in writing, nor so stated by the
bill: the vendor puts in an answer admitting the agreement as stated in
the bill; it takes it entirely out of the mischief; and there being no danger
of perjury, the court would decree it ... Then there are other cases, well
known, taken out of the statute, not so much on the principle of no danger
of perjury, as that the statute was not intended to create or protect fraud.
As where agreements have been carried partly into execution: although
a controversy might be afterward between the parties as to the terms, yet
if made out satisfactorily to the court, it would be decreed, though variety
of evidence might be in the case; In order that one side might not take
advantage of the statute to be guilty of fraud, the court would hold his
conscience bound thereby.35
That the purpose of the statute was to prevent proof by perjured
testimony and that the defendant's -admission removed the danger of
perjury and took the case out of the statute is accepted in a dictum of
Lord Mansfield in 1766.36
In 1789, Lord Thurlow decided the case of Whitohurck v. Bevis.
3"
To a bill alleging an oral contract and acts of part performance, the
defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds, but did not aver in his plea
that there had been no parol agreement. His answer went only to the
part performance, and did not deny the parol agreement. The sufficiency
on the ground that the agreement was admitted, I had occasion to look into that; and,
it is completely a misstatement. It appears by Lord Hardwicke's own notes, that it was
upon the agreement having been in fact executed that he determined that case." But in
the case next cited, note 34 infra, Lord Hardwicke's opinion, written only nine years after
his decision in Cottington v. Fletcher, recognizes the propriety of enforcement both where
the agreement has been executed and where the defendant's answer confesses the oral
agreement. See also Lacon v. Mertins, 2 Dickens 664 (Ch. 1743).
34 1 Ves. Sr. 218 (Ch. 1749).
35 Id. at 220.
36 Simon v. Metivier, I W. Bla. 599, 600 (1766). Here it was decided that an auction
sale in which the auctioneer had taken down the buyer's name was not within the statute.
Lord Mansfield said: "The object of the legislature in that statute was a wise one; and
what the Legislature meant is the rule both at law and equity; for, in this case, both
are the same. The key to the construction of the act is the intent of the Legislature;
and therefore many cases, though seemingly within the letter, have been let out of it;
more instances have indeed occurred in Courts of equity than of law, but the rule is in
both the same. For instance, where a man admits the contract to have been made, it is
out of the statute; for there can be no perjury."
37 2 Bro. C.C. 559 (Ch. 1789).
[Vol. 3 7
ETHICS AND STATUTE OF FRAUDS
of the plea was three times argued before being held to be bad, but then,
after final reargument, was held to be good, with, however, reservations
which will be presently emphasized.
The case would seem to be immediately distinguishable as one where
acts of part performance took the case out of the statute, and therefore,
deprived the defendant of the benefit of the statute and left him only
the opportunity to deny the making of the agreement and the alleged
acts of part performance. But, as the following excerpt from the Lord
Chancellor's first opinion 8 shows, he considered the alleged acts insuf-
ficient to take the case out of the statute and, accordingly, treated the
case as one where the defendant admitted the parol agreement but
pleaded the statute.
Supposing you have laid a sufficient part performance in your bill, I
cannot conceive the plea would have held, it would have been like Lord
Aylesford's case, where the agreement was carried into execution, and the
plea of the statute overruled. But the great point is, whether you can plead
the Statute of Frauds, without supporting the plea by an answer, averring
that there was no parol agreement. I put out of the case all the facts,
charged in the bill as part performance, considering them as weak and
trivial, and by no means amounting to a part performance; and my de-
termination now goes upon the bill, as brought to enforce the performance
of a parol agreement.39
After commenting upon Lord Macclesfield's decision in Child v. Go-
dolphin,40 Lord Thurlow's opinion continued:
Actions at law continue to be brought, as they used to be, upon a general
statement of the agreement in the declaration, and the defendant intro-
duces the statute by the plea. So in this Court; but this Court has laid
down two exceptions, by which, if they are to be sustained, it amounts to
the same thing as if the statute had made the exception of the two cases,
that is where the agreement is confessed by the answer, or where there is
a part performance. The consequence is that if the bill states a part per-
formance, the defendant must answer to the agreement, as well as to the
part performance, according to Lord Aylesworth's case, which is founded
on extreme good sense. So, where the Court has laid it down as a clear
exception from the statute, that the danger of fraud and perjury is avoided
where the defendant admits the agreement, it is requisite that he should
answer the agreement. . . But what will become of the statute? The
bill will not be sustained unless the defendant confesses the agreement
by his answer; you shall not prove it aliunde. If the bill had only stated
the parol agreement without the part performance, the plea would not have
applied, the agreement must be answered. I am aware, that except the
case determined by Lord Macclesfield, there is no other; the opinion I give
is, that if nothing had been stated in the bill but a parol agreement, if
38 Id. at 566.
39 Ibid.
40 See note 29 supra.
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the defendant pleads, he must support his plea by an answer) denying the
parol agreement, the only effect of the statute being that it shall not be
proved aliunde. If he answers and says there was no parol agreement,
I think no evidence that can be given will sustain the suit. If this doctrine
be not maintainable, the judgment I am giving is wrong.4 '
After reargument, the Lord Chancellor's final opinion begins with
this sentence: "In this case the agreement stands confessed in the
answer." But then, after analyzing the negotiations and the terms of
the alleged agreement as stated in the bill and answer, he seems to have
come to the conclusion that there were circumstances left to be defined
and stated in a writing to be signed and that defendant withdrew before
this was done.
... so that there is much more general matter than merely the agree-
ment stated in the bill amounted to, or to which the statute of frauds
might be intended to apply, and it must have been a case where the parties
were proceeding with such preparations as were necessary for the final
agreement of the contract. Immediately after the bargain was off, the bill
was filed, stating the case, and a plea was put in coupled with an answer
to all these particulars. The answer then does not overrule the plea, be-
cause perfectly distinct, and does not apply to a contract upon which
the plea went; and therefore the plea ought to be allowed, and conse-
quently the exception to it ought to be overruled.... I am prepared to say,
if there be general instructions for an agreement, consisting of material
circumstances, to be hereafter extended more at large, and to be put into
the form of an instrument, with a view to be signed by the parties but the
party takes advantage of the locus penitentiae, he shall not be compelled
to perform such an agreement as that when he insists upon the statute.42
There, we have the Lord Chancellor's decision. However, his ex-
pressed reservation regarding the principle of admitting the agreement
and pleading the statute is most significant in connection with our chro-
nological review of the doctrine and indicates that he still adhered to it
as a general proposition.
I mean to determine upon the ground of this particular case; because
it may become to be more seriously considered what sort of a verbal agree-
ment, notwithstanding the plea of the statute of frauds may be sustained,
as being confessed by the answer, so as this Court will 'carry it into
execution.4
41 2 Bro. C.C. 559, 566-567 (Ch. 1789).
4 2 'Id. at 569.
43 Ibid. Whitbread v. Brockhurst, 1 Bro. C.C. 404 (Ch. 1784), had been decided by
Lord Thurlow five years earlier. There the bill alleged a written agreement and acts of
part performance. The defendant pleaded the statute and in the plea averred (1) that
there was no contract in writing and (2) that there were no acts of part performance.
It was held that the plea must stand for an answer because it did not present a single
bar to the action but contained inconsistent averments; if there was no contract in
writing then the plea would be good, but if there were acts of part performance taking
the case out of the statute, then the plea of the statute would be bad. See discussion of
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Thus, for more than one hundred years after the passage of the Statute
of Frauds, there continued to be expressions of belief in the principle
that the statute was not intended to be used to defeat performance of
an admitted oral agreement. It is true that the actual decisions to this
effect are few, but the continuity of the dicta demonstrates the force of
the principle and an inclination to adhere to it.
However, toward the close of the eighteenth century, conflicting no-
tions began to creep in and these supplied the foundation for the ultimate
reversal of the old rule and the establishment of the present-day major-
ity rule.
Reference has already been made to the Treatise of Equity, printed
in 1737.44 It was this same treatise that was republished in 1793 with
the addition of marginal references and notes by John Fonblanque,
Esq.s To the section already quoted,4" Fonblanque appended a lengthy
note, the opening paragraph of which is:
If a defendant confess the agreement charged in the bill, there is cer-
tainly no danger of fraud or perjury in decreeing performance of such
agreement. But it Is of considerable importance to determine whether the
defendant be bound to confess or deny a mere parol agreement not alleged
to be in any part executed? or, if he do confess it, whether he may not
insist on the statute, in bar of the performance of it?
47
The decisions, he says, are numerous and irreconcilable and he pro-
ceeds to "consider them in their principle rather than in detail." The con-
flict in views can be best stated in his own words. Upon the first point,
he says:
They who insist that the defendant is bound to confess or deny the
agreement alleged, principally rely on the rule of equity, that the defendant
is bound to confess or deny all facts which, if confessed, would give the
plaintiff a claim or title to the relief prayed; and that as equity would de-
cree a parol agreement, if confessed, the defendant must confess or deny it.
It is certainly a general rule in equity, that the defendant shall discover
the case in BEAmss, ELEmmNTs OF PLEAS 3x EQuiTY 173 (1818). In the course of his
opinion, Lord Thurlow, by way of dictum, expressed indecision as to the effectiveness of
a plea after an admission of the contract.
In Whitchurch v. Bevis, note 37 supra, at 568, Lord Thurlow referred to Whaley v.
Bagnel, 1 Bro. P.C. 345 (1765). This was an appeal from the decision of the Lord
Chancellor of Ireland sustaining a plea of the statute with an accompanying averment
that there had been no writing signed by the defendants. The appeal was dismissed
without opinion. Lord Thurlow speaks of this case as holding that when defendant has
pleaded the statute but has not confessed the agreement, the court will not compel
performance.
44 Note 28 supra.
45 FoxBLA sati's EQuiny (1793).
46 See page 362 supra.
47 FoNBAnwQus's EQTrY, note 40, bk. I, c. III, § 8, 168, et seq. (1793).
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whatever is material to the justice of the plaintiff's case; but in applying
this rule to the case of a parol agreement, it is previously material to
ascertain, whether the statute of frauds has not in such case relieved the
defendant from his general obligation. The prevention of frauds and per-
juries is the declared object of the statute; and the decreeing of a parol
agreement when confessed by the defendant, and the statute not insisted
on, is evidently consistent with such object. . . . But if the defendant be
bound to confess or deny the parol agreement, his answer must be liable
to contradiction, or not liable to contradiction. If the defendant's answer
be liable to contradiction by evidence aliunde, the evil arising from contra-
dictory evidence, which the statute proposed to guard against, would
necessarily result. If the defendant's answer be. not liable to contradiction
by evidence aliunde, the rule would furnish a temptation to perjury, by
giving the defendant a certain interest in denying the agreement; since,
if he confessed it, he would be bound to perform it.. . . It would ill be-
come me to pursue this point further; the difficulties which I have stated
are probably sufficient to explain and justify the contrariety of opinion
which has prevailed upon it.
48
Upon the second point, whether a defendant having confessed the
alleged agreement, can protect himself from performance by insisting
upon the statute, he observes thaf
This, which is also a vexatious question, is almost immediately dependent
on the former point; for when Lord Macclesfield, in Child v. Godolphin,
held that the defendant was bound to confess or deny the agreement, it
seems to have been a necessary consequence that if the defendant con-
fessed the agreement, he would not be allowed to avail himself of the
statute, ciii bono compel him to confess or deny the agreement? But if
the defendant be not bound to confess or deny the agreement, it must
be in respect to the statute affording him a good defence against the
performance of it. .... 49
Such was the dilemma which the courts fashioned for themselves as
the eighteenth century turned into the nineteenth. Having for one hun-
dred years believed that the statute was intended to prevent fraud as
well as perjury and that it would be against good conscience for de-
fendant to defeat performance of a parol agreement, the making of
which he could not deny, they came to the point where they would per-
mit the defendant to perjure himself by denying the making of the
agreement or, if he admitted it, would ignore the admission as a con-
fession enforced by their own rules of pleading. This indeed sounds in-
consistent with our present-day ideas that one must admit or deny,
under oath, every material allegation in a verified complaint, and it
must seem to us as foreign to the purposes both of eighteenth and nine-
teenth century rules of pleading and of the seventeenth century Statute
of Frauds.
48 Ibid.
49 Id. at 170.
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The contrariety of opinion, of which Fonblanque speaks, may have
been generated by the confusion and vacillation exhibited by Lord
Thurlow in his decisions 0 and by the apparent conflict between courts
of law and courts of equity.
Reasoning similar to that of Fonblanque is found in the opinion of
Lord Chief Justice Loughborough in Rondeau v. Wyatt,' decided in
1792. This was an action for damages for breach of a contract to sell and
deliver grain. Defendant pleaded the general issue. A trial resulted in a
verdict for the plaintiff. The case was then argued on a rule to show
cause why the verdict should not be set aside and a non-suit entered. In
opposition to the rule, plaintiff argued that the case did not fall within
the statute because the contract was executory and, secondly, if it did,
it was taken out by defendant's confession of the oral agreement in a
previous suit in equity.52 In granting the non-suit, Lord Loughborough
decided that the contract was within the statute, though executory, and
was not taken out by defendant's admission. Referring to cases in equity,
he said:
It is said in those cases, and has been adopted in the argument, that
when the defendant confesses the agreement there is no danger of perjury,
which is the only thing the statute intended to prevent. But this seems
to be very bad reasoning, for the calling upon a party to answer a parol
agreement certainly lays him under a great temptation to commit perjury.
But though the preventing of perjury was one, yet it was not the sole
object of the statute: another object was to lay down a clear and positive
rule to determine whether the contract of sale should be complete ...
It is not necessary in a court of law to inquire into the modes of pro-
ceeding by which courts of equity are guided; but it is observable, that
the case of Whaley v. Bagenal in the House of Lords coincides with the
present determination of the court. 3
In 1798, Lord Loughborough was now Lord Chancellor and had an
opportunity to imprint his views in the equity reports. In an action for
specific performance of an agreement to lease, the plaintiff had alleged
the taking of possession and the making of improvements. To a request
60 Whitbread v. Brockhurst, 1 Bro. C.C. 404 (Ch. 1784) ; Whitchurch v. Bevis, 2 Bro.
C.C. 559 (Ch. 1789); Rondeau v. Wyatt, 3 Bro. C.C. 154 (Ch. 1790); Bowers v. Cator,
4 Ves. 91 (Ch. 1798).
61 2 H. Blk. 63, 68 (1792).
52 Rondeau v. Wyatt, 3 Bro. C.C. 154 (Ch. 1790). Here the report states that plaintiff
prayed a discovery of the facts in order to found an action at law. Defendant pleaded
the statute and by averment, negatived the exceptions in the statute. The plea was sup-
ported by an answer, but the nature of the answer is not stated. Lord Thurlow said
nothing about the effect of an admission in the answer, but, in overruling the plea, put
his decision on the ground that he was bound by the decision at law that such executory
contracts were not within the statute.
53 2 H. Blk. 63, 68 (1792). As to Whaley v. Bagenal, see note 43 supra.
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for a discovery, defendant pleaded the statute, averring no writing
signed by him or his agent, and in his answer he said that plaintiff en-
tered only as tenant from year to year and that the other acts were not
sufficient to take the case out of the statute. The Lord Chancellor held
that the answer was argumentative and that the plea would have to
stand for answer. To the defendant he said:
Insist upon the statute of frauds as a defense against performing the
agreement. Your admitting the agreement does not prevent you from
insisting upon the statute. Saving the benefit of the plea to the hearing
gives you a right to insist upon the statute of frauds as a defense to this
suit: but it does not exempt you from the discovery. If the agreement is
proved by distinct evidence still you are entitled to the benefit of the
statute.54
Lord Eldon discussed the issue in two cases.m In the first of these,
Cooth v. Jackson, he found that the alleged acts of part performance
were insufficient and that the agreement admitted by the answer was
different from that set forth in the bill and from that established by
testimony, but the ground for dismissing the bill was that the alleged
agreement had been induced by the unethical conduct and misrepre-
sentations of commissioners appointed in litigation between the parties
which was intended to be compromised by the agreement. Therefore,
his comments upon the necessity of an answer and the effect of an ad-
mission would seem to be dictum. However, in Rowe v. Teed, he treats
his statement upon these points as his decision in the prior case.
. . . until it was settled here [Cooth Vk. Jackson] that the defendant
might take advantage of the Statute by his answer, admitting the agree-
ment. Until that was so settled, the answer admitting the agreement, it
was immaterial whether the acts alleged to have been done in part per-
formance, were denied or not; as the agreement, being admitted, must
have been performed. 56
In between these two decisions, Sir William Grant, Master of the
Rolls, said in Blagden v. Bradbear:
The plaintiff says the defendant admits the terms; but according to
the modem, and I think the correct doctrine,57 it is immaterial what ad-
missions are made by a defendant, insisting tipon the benefit of the
statute; for he throws it upon the plaintiff to show a complete written
agreement; and it can no more be thrown upon the defendant to supply
defects in the agreement than to supply the want of an agreement.58
54 Moore v. Edwards, 4 Ves. Jr. 23, 24 (Ch. 1798).
5 Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Ves. Jr. 12 (Ch. 1801); Rowe v. Teed, 15 Ves. Jr. 372 (Ch.
1808).
506 15 Ves. Jr. 375 (Ch. 1808).
57 Cooth v. Jackson, note 55 supra, is cited.
58 12 Ves. Jr. 466, 471 (Ch. 1806). The suit was upon a sale at auction. The answer,
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These excerpts from Fonblanque and from the opinions of Lord
Loughborough, Lord Eldon and Sir William Grant reveal the evolution
of the thinking leading to the change in attitude and in decisions. The
rule that required the defendant to admit or deny, under oath, every
material allegation in the complaint meant that if he confessed the
agreement, it should be enforced because it was proved by his own ad-
mission and without the danger of the perjured testimony of others. But
such a result supplied the defendant with an inducement to make a
perjured denial of the agreement. 9 It was considered better to remove
the temptation than to hold the defendant to an agreement conscien-
tiously admitted to have been entered into. The way to do that, it was
thought, was to expect his answer to state the truth, but then to ignore
the confession which the rules of pleading and his conscience required
him to make, and to justify this under the pretext that the Statute of
Frauds itself exhibited that legislative intent, a theory first evolved
about a century and a quarter after the passage of that act.
The crystallization of this new theory is well stated by Vice Chan-
cellor Page Wood in Jackson v. Oglander in 1865:
The defendant very candidly admits the whole of the agreement; but
then he relies on the statute; and that makes it necessary for the Court
to see whether there is any document to be found which would have been
sufficient to prove the agreement, supposing that the defendant (for that
is what I must consider him to ha, e done), had denied the existence of
the agreement and challenged the plaintiff to the proof of it .... Then
it is said, "the fact of the agreement is admitted as a fact by the answer;
and then the letters and documents show sufficiently what the agreement
was to take the case out of the statute"; but I do not think I can look at
that portion of the answer which admits the agreement, seeing that the
defendant insists on the statute of frauds. The defendant must answer,
must swear to the truth of his answer, and must sign it: if I were to make
any use of an admission so extorted, I should in effect repeal the statute.60
"admitting the conditions of sale, denied that the auctioneer was authorized by the defendant
to sign any memorandum...."
59 In Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Ves. Jr. 12, 39-40 (Ch. 1801) Lord Eldon said, in drawing
a distinction between proceedings at law and in equity,
It seems to have been forgotten in courts of law that here the testimony of wit-
nesses is appreciated, not only by the intrinsic credit due to that testimony, but
also by the consideration, what the defendant, against whom it is produced, has
said by his answer. If the defendant denies that any parol agreement ever took
place, a court of equity will not inquire into the truth of that denial. Then can
the doctrine of a court of law and a court of equity with regard to part per-
formance be the same? In every case, where the parties go to issue, a court of
law must understand that the defendant does deny it; and a single witness would
according to that doctrine fix upon the defendant at law the whole effect of the
equitable jurisiction; whereas, if the plaintiff comes here, the moment the defendant
in the form in which issue is here joined, by his answer says there was no agree-
ment, the witness could not be heard; or, if he was heard, unless supported by
special circumstances, giving his testimony greater weight than the denial by the
answer, the court would not make the decree.
GO 2 Hem. & M. 465, 472-473, 13 L. T. 16, 13 W. R. 936, 71 All Eng. R. 544 (1865).
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Turning now to the law of the United States, a South Carolina deci-
sion in 1794 reflects adherence to the view which had prevailed in Eng-
land up to that time. In that case we find it said:
The court has no difficulty in decreeing the agreement to be specifically
executed for the defendant, by his answer which he signed, having acknowl-
edged the agreement, the court considers it such an assent in writing as
overrules his plea of the statute of frauds.61
However, the influence of the views of Lord Loughborough and of
Fonblanque very promptly crossed the Atlantic, and we find the latter's
treatise cited and his thoughts paraphrased by Cranch, C. J., in Thomp-
son v.. Jameson in 1806.1 Here the defendant had pleaded the statute
but admitted the oral agreement to answer for the debt of another. The
reasoning used by the Chief Judge in dismissing the bill will, by now,
sound familiar to us:
If the defendant is obliged to answer and confess a parol agreement,
there is no possIble case in which a parol agreement can be vacated by
that statute; unless the defendant will commit perjury by denying it.
Instead therefore of preventing frauds and perjuries, the statute would tend
to increase them; for by preventing the plaintiff from proving a parol
agreement by any other evidence than the defendant's own oath, it holds
out to the defendant the strongest temptation to perjury, and at the same
time gives him a perfect security against detection. If the defendant is
bound to confesss the parol agreement it must be because when confessed
he could not avail himself of the statute. But it is settled that he may
avail himself of the statute. Hence it seems to follow that he is not
bound to confess; for this would be to compel him to confess an imma-
terial fact.63
With a little different emphasis, he says:
The act evidently refers to the relief, and it is at least as strongly
expressed as if it had said that no action shall be maintained upon a
parol promise, even if proved in any manner whatever. The confession
therefore of a parol promise is not a confession of any cause of action
either at law or in equity. A court of equity cannot, more than a court
of law, dispense with the positive and clear prohibition of a statute.64
It seems not unnatural that, in the infancy of our national life, our
61 Smith v. Brailsford, 1 Dess. Eq. 350, 352 (S.C. 1794). The defendant had gone into
possession, but the case was taken out of the statute by an admission in the answer
rather than by the doctrine of part performance. The quoted statement was repeated with
approval in Wallace v. Dowling, 86 S.C. 307, 310, 68 S.E. 571, 572 (1910), but it was
also held that a contract for the sale of goods to be manufactured did not fall within the
statute.
62 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,960 (1806). For an expression of view similarly based upon
Lord Loughborough and Fonblanque, see Argenbright v. Campbell, 2 Hen. & Mun. 144,
161 et seq. (Va. 1808).
63 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,760 at 1052 (1806).
64 Ibid.
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newly established courts, struggling to apply their own replicas of the
English Statute of Frauds, should have adopted the changed English
viewpoint that became current at the close of the 18th century. That is
the explanation of what we find as the majority view in this country
today. But there has long been a minority viewpoint and there is evi-
dence of increasing dissatisfaction with the majority rule.
In Iowa, the problem was removed from judicial interpretation a
century ago. The Iowa legislature incorporated into its Statute of Frauds
sections which made it clear that this legislation a) established only a
rule of evidence prohibiting proof of an oral contract through the tes-
timony of others, but b) precluded the use of the statute as a defense
except where the defendant denied the making of the agreement, and
c) made it possible for the plaintiff to prove the agreement through the
testimony of the defendant himself.' The defendant who could not deny
and who must under oath admit the contract was not endangered by
fraudulent proof through perjured testimony.
The same ethical standard has been enunciated through judicial de-
cisions in Maryland, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. In a 1945 case,
Sealock v. Hackley 6" the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided in
favor of the plaintiff where he sought specific performance of an oral
contract for the sale of land and the defendant, as a witness, had ad-
mitted the agreement. In the opinion, the court said:
It is an outstanding fact in this case that the oral agreement was ad-
( 2 IA. CoDE § 622.34 (1950). "The above regulations, relating merely to the proof
of contracts, shall not prevent the enforcement of those not denied in the pleading, except
in cases when the contract is sought to be enforced, or damages recovered for the breach
thereof, against some person other than him who made it." id. § 622.35. "The oral
evidence of the maker against whom the unwritten contract is sought to be enforced shall
be competent to establish the same." See Auter v. Miller, 18 Ia. 405 (1865). It seems
surprising that, in the face of these provisions, Iowa courts once held that the statute
might be raised by demurrer. But after a motion to dismiss was substituted for the
demurrer, it seems that the statute cannot now be raised by the motion. See 1 DPRAx L.
REV. 27, 32 (1951), where the writer concludes that since the statute is not specified as
a ground for such a motion,
It would appear, therefore, that the only effective way to raise the defense of the
statute of frauds since 1943 would be to deny the contract, if one honestly could,
ths putting in issue the existence of the contract and forcing the plaintiff to prove
his allegation. When the evidence of the oral contract is offered by the plaintiff,
the defendant should object that the evidence is oral and thus incompetent under
the Statute of Frauds. To permit any procedure short of the denial of the con-
tract, would defeat the purpose of the statute and enable the defendant to commit
a fraud upon the plaintiff instead of to prevent a fraud.
For discussion of the Iowa cases, see IowA L. BULL. 72-75 (1917). As to the effect to be
given defendant's testimony, see McCutcban v. Iowa State Bank, 232 Ia. 550, 5 N.W.2d
813 (1942) and cases cited.
66 186 Md. 49, 45 A.2d 744 (194 6).
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mitted by Sealock in his own testimony .... Therefore, the Statute of
Frauds does not prevent enforcement of this agreement, after Sealock
subsequently acquired the property from the heirs. As stated in Trossbach
v. Trossbach, 184 Md. 47, 42 A. 2d 905, the admissions of a party in
the form of testimony constitute sufficient "memoranda" or "writings"
under the Statute of Frauds, for recorded testimony is regarded as equiva-
lent to signed depositions. The purpose of the Statute of Frauds Is to
protect a party, not from temptation to commit perjury, but from per-
jured evidence against him. Admissions of a party in testifying, while
evidence in form, are in essence not mere evidence, but make evidence
against him unnecessary.
67
In the same year, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a de-
murrer may be sustained where the complaint shows on its face that the
contract sought to be enforced was an oral one and the facts alleged as
part performance were insufficient to take it out of the statute.68 In
answer to plaintiff's contention that a demurrer should not be sustained
because, under the decision in Sealock v. Hackley,6 9 there was hope that
the defendants might admit the agreement in their testimony, the court
said: "Whatever the hopes of the appellants might be, they cannot take
away from Max Lazarus & Sons the right to interpose a demurrer to
this bill, and we have said that the demurrer thus interposed is good." 70
Incidentally, it now seems settled in most jurisdictions that the Statute
of Frauds may be raised by demurrer or motion to dismiss the complaint. 71
Such a ruling is, of course, consistent with the majority position that an
admission in an answer does not prevent the pleading of the statute. In
fact, in that period of transition at the end of the eighteenth century, a
reason assigned to support a change to the latter rule was that if the de-
fendant might raise the statute by demurrer, he should be permitted to
plead the statute while admitting the agreement in his answer.72 On the
67 Id. at 52, 45 A.2d at 746.
68 Kauffman v. Adalman, 186 Md. 639, 47 A.2d 755 (1946).
69 See note 66 supra.
70 Kauffman v. Adalman, 186 Md. 639, 651, 47 A.2d 755, 762 (1946).
71 BROWNE, STATuTE or FRAuDS § 509 (5th ed. 1895).
72 This point is interestingly developed in Cornett v. Clere, 193 Ky. 590, 236 S. W. 1036,
22 A.L.R. 720 (1922). In an action for specific performance of a land contract, the
answer admitted the oral contract and the receipt of several down payments from plaintiff
purchaser but pleaded the statute. The trial court held that the admissions clarified the
payments as unambiguous acts of part performance and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
(See discussion below in the Missouri case of Jones v. Jones, note 84 infra). In reversing,
it was reasoned that, since defendant might have demurred, an admission of the contract
in the answer would put the defendant in no worse position. It was further said that if
a pleading by which one asserts his defense were taken as a sufficient memorandum of
the agreement, "one would never dare set forth the true facts in a pleading, where he
desired to interpose the statute as a defense, and the real purpose of the statute would be
largely if not entirely defeated." Cornett v. Clere, 193 Ky. 590, 593, 236 S. W. 1036, 1037
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other hand, the conflict as to the propriety of a demurrer was generated
by the converse reasoning that since a defendant who admitted the agree-
ment could not avail himself of the statute, he should not be permitted to
raise the issue by demurrer. 3 It is not surprising, therefore, that Chan-
celler Walworth, after reviewing the English precedents up to 1830,
concluded that the propriety of a demurrer had not by that date been
decided in England.74 It is submitted that the ethical interpretation and
application of the statute, for which we are here contending, should rule
out the propriety of the demurrer. The plaintiff should, as in former
times, be entitled to a sworn admission or denial of the making of the
agreement, and a jurisdiction which holds to the view that a defendant
who admits the agreement does not need the statutory shield against
perjury should not allow him, by demurring, to use the statute as a
sword.75
In a New Jersey case in which the plaintiff was seeking to compel the
defendant to perform his oral promise to release certain property from
a mortgage, the defendant denied the agreement in his answer but ad-
(1922). The court regretted the supposed necessity for the decision by saying: "However
much the sympathies of the court may be inclined toward the widow and eight children
who are the appellees in this case, the statutory law of this state, the declared public
policy, forbids the enforcement of verbal contracts for the sale of real property, and we
cannot yield to the impulse." Ibid.
73 BROWNE, STATUTE or FRAuDs § 510 (5th ed. 1895).
74 Cozine v. Graham, 2 Paige 177 (N.Y. 1830). Here the demurrer was overruled on the
theory that an alleged agreement would be presumed to be enforcible unless the complaint
showed it was not in writing. Wood v. Midgley, 5 De G. M. & G. 41 (1854), demurrer
sustained when bill showed contract not signed by defendant.
75 In New York, a motion to dismiss the complaint has been substituted for the demur-
rer and Rules 106 and 107 of the Rules of Civil Practice make a distinction between
motions which may be made on the complaint and motions which may be made on the
basis of the complaint and affidavit. It would support the reasoning and conclusions of
this article if the New York courts were to construe these rules as requiring that a motion
to dismiss on the ground of the Statute of Frauds can be made only on complaint and
affidavit, Rule 107. It is to be noted that the Statute of Frauds as a ground for dismissal
is specified in Rule 107, subdiv. 8, and is not mentioned in Rule 106. However, Rule 106
permits a motion to dismiss on the complaint, without affidavit, where the defect appears
on the face of the complaint. Accordingly, it can be argued that a motion may be made
under Rule 106 if the fact that the contract was oral is stated in the complaint. But it
is not clear that this was intended by the Judicial Council which was responsible for the
amendments of the Rules in 1944, for Rule 107 provides that "a motion specifying an
objection set forth in subdivisions . . . 8 [Statute of Frauds] . . . may be made whether
or not the defect appears on the face of the complaint." In spite of the use of the word
"may", the Council seems to have intended that a motion based upon the objection of
the Statute of Frauds should be taken -under Rule 107, i.e., upon the complaint and
affidavit. See TrT ANNtAL REPORT OF THE JuiciA CouNciL 317-322 (1944). Piccione
v. Schultz, 99 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1950), holds that the motion may be
made under Rule 107 and may not be made under Rule 106.
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mitted it as a witness at the trial. In granting specific performance, the
court said:
But whatever the rule should be in a case in which there is a denial
of the making of an oral promise to release all or part of mortgaged
premises from the lien of a mortgage, it is difficult to perceive why the
statute should be a bar to compelling one to carry out an honest agree-
ment into which he had entered with another and which he admits having
made. The statute of frauds was designed to protect the innocent from
fake claims that were made and enforcement of which was secured through
perjury. 6
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 1946, was presented with the
same question as to the effect to be given defendant's testimony admit-
ting the agreement, and it reached the same conclusion in the case of
Zlotziver v. Zlotziver,7 7 stating its reasoning as follows:
The statute of frauds, however, does not absolutely invalidate an oral
contract relating to land but is intended merely to guard against perjury
on the part of one claiming under the alleged agreement. Accordingly,
if the title holder admits, either in his pleadings or his testimony, that
he did in fact enter into the contract, the purpose of the statute of frauds
is served and the oral agreement will be enforced by the court.78 Here
the defendant, in his testimony, admitted the making of the agreement
as claimed by plaintiff.79
In 1949, the same court, with identical membership, decided Haskell
v. Heathcote et al.,8° and it may be considered that certain statements
in the opinion in this case undermine the full force of the decision in the
Zlotziver case. To a bill requesting specific performance of an oral agree-
ment, defendant had interposed preliminary objections raising the de-
fense of the statute. Pending disposition of those objections, plaintiff
moved for an order to take the deposition of the defendant, "averring,
inter alia, that if Mrs. Heathcote were required to testify under oath,
she would admit the alleged oral agreement."81 Mrs. Heathcote filed a
responsive answer specifically denying that she entered into the oral
contract. Thereupon, the trial court denied the motion and entered a
16 Degher v. Carobine, 100 NJ. Eq. 493, 501, 135 AtI. 518, 522 (1927), noted 36 YAL,
LJ. 1188 (1927).
7 355 Pa. 299, 49 A.2d 779 (1946), 15 A.L.R.2d 1349 (1948). In Mezza v. Beiletti,
161 Pa. Super. 213, 52 A.2d 835 (1947), since defendant had admitted the contract in his
answer and in his testimony, on the authority of the Zlotziver case, the defense of the
Statute of Frauds was not even considered.
78 At this point the court cited Sperro v. Urling, 328 Pa. 161, 167, 168, 195 At. 422,
425, 426 (1937); Williams v. Moodhard, 341 Pa. 273, 280, 281, 19 A.2d 101, 104, 105
(1941) ; Shaffer v. Shaffer, 344 Pa. 158, 161, 23 A.2d 883, 885 (1942).
79 355 Pa. 299, 302, 49 A.2d 779, 781 (1949).
80 363 P'a. 184, 69 A.2d 71 (1949).
81 Id. at 186, 69 A.2d at 73.
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decree dismissing the complaint. On appeal, it was held that the defense
of the statute may be raised by preliminary objections and that the
trial court had not erred in denying the motion to take defendant's depo-
sition. The court emphasized the fact that defendant denied the exist-
ence of the alleged oral contract "and there is no contrary admission by
her of record in the proceedings to constitute a waiver. '8 2 The court
refers to the Zlotziver decision twice: once, as illustrative of equitable
considerations making it impossible to do justice save by specific per-
formance, and then, as illustrative of instances of waiving the statute
"by admitting the contract in his pleadings or in his testimony in the
proceedings without invoking its protection."83 If this is taken to mean
that a defendant will not be held where he insists upon the defense of
the statute even though he admits the oral contract, then Pennsylvania
cannot be credited with an advance in the law or, what is the same, a
reversion to what was the law prior to 1790. If it means only that equity
will respect the oath of a defendant, as it always fias, and that there can
be no attack upon his sworn denial of the existence of an alleged con-
tract, then these two decisions can be taken as sound interpretations of
the purpose of the statute.
A case which illustrates the judicial process through which both prog-
ress and justice are achieved is the Missouri decision of Jones v. Jones.
84
Here the complaint alleged an agreement to employ the plaintiff as at-
torney in a will contest and to deed him 118 acres of an 1100 acre tract
if he were successful. There was also an allegation that the services had
been successfully rendered. The defendant, in his answer, admitted the
contract but pleaded the statute. The court reaffirmed its adherence to
the majority rule which enables the defendant thus to defeat an ad-
mitted agreement, but, nevertheless found a way to justify the granting
of specific performance. Though the rendering of services is usually
held to be too equivocal to constitute a part performance sufficient to
take a case out of the statute, yet here the court held that the defend-
ant's admission removed that ambiguity and definitely connected the
services with the alleged contract to convey and as part performance of
it, without the need for the testimony of others. It will probably be con-
82 Id. at 188-189, 69 A.2d at 73.
8 Ibid. *
84 333 Mo. 478, 63 S.W.2d 146, 90 A.L.R. 219 (1933). Cf. Cornett v. Clere, note 72
supra, where the trial court's decision, consistent with Jones v. Jones, was reversed by the
supreme court of Kentucky. Cf. Holste et at. v. Baker, et al., 223 Minn. 321, 26 N.W.2d
473 (1947), and Baker et at. v. Heavrin, 148 Neb. 766, 29 N.W.2d 373 (1947), in each
of which cases the court found the acts of part performance insufficient and denied specific
performance without attributing any effect to the defendant's admission of the agreement.
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ceded that justice was done and that the purpose of the statute was sup-
ported rather than defeated.
On the moral plane, there is complete similarity between the three
instances in which a defendant was, in the early history of the statute,
denied the privilege of pleading it in order to escape performance of an
honorable obligation: a) where his own fraud was responsible for the
non-existence of the required signed memorandum, 5 b) under the equit-
able doctrine of part performance,86 and c) where the defendant admits
the contract. In each instance, it would be unconscionable for the de-
fendant to escape liability on the technical ground that a formal memo-
randum was lacking. The three instances are thrown together as ex-
ceptions to the statute in A Treatise of Equity, published in 1737,7 and
Lord Thurlow in Whitchurch v. Bevis, said:
... But this court has laid down two exceptions, by which, if they are
to be sustained, it amounts to the same thing as if the statute had made
the exception of the two cases, that is where the agreement Is confessed
by the answer, or where there is a part performance.88
The statute was intended to prevent fraud as well as perjury and,
therefore, the three exceptions were regarded as consistent with the
statute's purpose. Under the doctrine of part performance, it has been
rightly held that the acts sufficient "to take the case out of the statute"
must so unequivocally establish the existence -of the contract alleged to
have been made by the defendant that it would be fraudulent of him to
take advantage of the statute; even though parol evidence might be
needed to prove the precise terms of the agreement. This doctrine be-
came so well established that, in many jurisdictions, it is a codified ex-
ception to the statute. The effect of the equitable doctrine of part per-
formance is to raise an estoppel against the use of the statute as a de-
fense. It is of more than passing significance that because of the recog-
nized fairness of this equitable doctrine which prevents the defendant's
escape from an honorable obligation, there is a rising trend toward the
adoption of the theory of estoppel in actions at law upon oral contracts
that have been acted upon with defendant's knowledge." This is another
85 Halfpenny v. Ballet, 1 Eq. Abr. 20, pl. 6, 2 Vern. 373 (1699), cited in Precedents
in Chancery 404 as Mullet v. Halfpenny (1699).
86 Butcher v. Stapley, 1 Vern. 363 (Ch. 1685).
87 Bk. I, c. III, § 8, p. 19, FONBLANQu:E, EQuiTY, bk. I, 167 et seq. (1793).
88 2 Brown C.C . 559, 566 (1789).
89 Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 1 A.2d 146, 117 A.L.R. 932
(1938), noted in 37 MIcH. L. REv. 673 (1939). This was a suit for damages for breach
of an oral contract to reconvey land. It was held that plaintiff's relief by estoppel, to
prevent manifest imposition and injustice, was coextensive with the relief available to her
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illustration of the consciousness of modern courts of law that they have
as much responsibility as courts of equity for preventing moral fraud.
Another lesson may be drawn from these developments. Because a
lawyer may feel that it is his duty to his client to plead all available de-
fenses, however technical and incompatible with justice, the law's cure
for the situation is a limitation upon the available defenses. That is pre-
cisely what equity did with the Statute of Frauds in instances of fraud,
part performance and an admitted agreement. That is what the law is
now doing with the Statute of Frauds when the alleged facts lay the
foundation for a just estoppel. There is considerable authority for estop-
ping a defendant from pleading the statute of limitations. ° Significant
also are the ancient equitable and modern legal attitudes toward repre-
sentations and promises which have been acted upon to the extent that
an estoppel is raised against pleading the defense of lack of considera-
tion.91
It is interesting to note that under French procedure, the French
counterpart of the Statute of Frauds may not be used as a defense unless
under the doctrine of partial performance in equity. Wikiosco, Inc. v. Proller, 276 App.
Div. 239, 94 N.Y.S.2d 645 (3d Dep't 1949), plaintiff sought damages for breach of an
oral agreement to form the plaintiff corporation, to subscribe to its shares and to pay
for them in part by the transfer of certain realty. At pp. 240-241 the court said, in
affirming an order denying a motion to dismiss the complaint,
That statute [N.Y. REAL PROPERTrY LAW § 259] does not render the oral contract
absolutely void. Its function is to bar a remedy. It may be effectively waived or
one may be estopped from its effective assertion. It is a defense, affirmative in
nature and in given instances unavailable unless pleaded and proven. . . . Here
facts capable of constituting the estoppel are pleaded and may be regarded as an
element of the cause of action. It was permissible to plead them to preclude
the defense and in many jurisdictions it has been held that to serve that end
it is necessary to do so.
Union Packing Co. v. Cariboo Land & Cattle Co. Ltd., 191 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1951);
cert. denied, 72 Sup. Ct. 303 (1952), petition for rehearing denied, 72 Sup. Ct. 376 (1952) ;
Holton v. Reed et a., 193 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1951), estoppel against asserting Statute of
Frauds as a defense to a counterclaim for specific performance of oral contract for the sale
of corporate shares; Seymour v. Oelricbs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909); Flint v.
Giguiere, 50 Cal. App. 314, 195 Pac. 85 (1920); Fleming v. Dawson, 82 Cal. Dec. 656,
4 P.2d 776 (1931), noted in 20 CAL. L. REv. 663 (1932) ; Wilk v. Vencill, 30 Cal. 2d 104,
180 P.2d 351 (1947), noted 36 CAnr'. L. REv. 138 (1948); Lacey v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla.
19, 105 P.2d 781 (1940), noted 11 OKrA. B. A. J. 1319. See Summers, The Doctrine of
Estoppel as Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 440 (1931). Cf. Schwartz
v. Greenberg, 108 N.Y.S.2d 421 (2d Dep't 1951), holding that where the proof established
that there was a contract, "failure to deliver a signed [by defendant] copy of the writing
setting forth the terms of that agreement cannot defeat its enforcement." The action was
for damage for breach of contract.
90 Decisions are collected in notes in 77 A.L.R. 1044 (1931) and 130 A.L.R. 8 (1939).
91 E.g., Seavey v. Drake, 6 N.H. 393 (1882), specific performance was granted to plain-
tiff who had acted upon an oral representation of a gift of land to him. For promissory
estoppel, see RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
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the defendant, if called upon, is willing to take an oath that he did not
make the contract. His unwilingness to take such an oath is regarded
as an admission of the agreement and results automatically in a judg-
ment for the plaintiff.92
In conclusion, the interpretation as well as the present day need for a
Statute of Frauds should be viewed from the standpoint of the state of
the law in 1677. Contract law was then still embryonic; trial by jury,
as we know it, was not perfected, and the power of the court to set aside
a verdict as contrary to the weight of evidence was not established;
rules of evidence were undeveloped and neither the parties themselves
nor any persons who had an interest in the outcome of the litigation
were competent witnesses.9 3 The need for protection against perjured
92 The author's learned colleague, Professor R. B. Schlesinger, has furnished the follow-
ing comment upon our problem as it arises under the French Statute of Frauds:
Subject' to certain exceptions, the French Civil Code provides sweepingly that
consensual transactions involving more than 5,000 Francs (about $15.00) can
be proved only by written evidence. See CODE Crv. Arts. 1341 ff. A translation
of these provisions of the French Code, with some annotations, appears in
SCLEsINGER, ComPARATVE LAW-CAsES AND MATERIAIS 211-213 (1950). -
The rule is phrased in terms which could easily be construed as an absolute,
substantive requirement of a writing. As to all matters exceeding the sum of
5,000 Francs, a writing "must be executed" (I1 doit 6tre pass6 acte). Neverthe-
less, the highest French court has held that an oral contract will be enforced if
its existence and its terms are admitted in court. Cass. Civ. July 3, 1889, D.P.
90.1.249. See also DALLoz, REPERTomRE PRATiQUE, Vol. IX, p. 473-4 (Preuve No.
1365) (1922).
Moreover, with respect to a fact determinative of the outcome of the lawsuit
a party may defer an oath to the other party. See CODE CIV. Arts. 1357 ff.
(reprinted, in translation, by SCHLESINGER, op. dt., supra pp. 215-217). If the
court finds that the case is a proper one for the demand of such an oath, and that
the party demanding it has properly formulated its tenor, then the next step is
up to the other party. The latter may in certain cases "refer" the oath, i.e.,
demand that the oath (its tenor being reversed) be taken by the party originally
demanding it. Finally, the party to whom the oath has been "deferred" or
"referred," will either swear it, in which event he automatically wins the lawsuit,
or fail to swear it within the time fixed by the court, in which event he auto-
matically loses.
May this device of the "decisive oath"- as it is called (CODE Crv. Art. 1357), be
used to prove the existence of an oral contract under which the rule of Art. 1341
could not be proved by ordinary testimony of witnesses? The answer is clearly in
the affirmative. Cass. Civ. Nov. 7, 1893, D.P. 94.1.15; Cour d'Appel Limoges,
Feb. 6, 1845, D.P. 46.4.458; DA.Loz, REPERTon PRATiQUE, Vol. IX, p. 487
(Preuve No. 1550-1552) (1922). This does not defeat the policy of Art.. 1341.
The defendant to whom an oath concerning the existence of an oral contract
has been deferred, may have a right at his election, to "refer" the oath back to
the plaintiff; but he does not have to "refer." He always has the right, again at
his election, to swear the oath himself. Thus he can be defeated only f he, of
his own free will, by "referring" the oath or by refusing to swear it, shows his
unwillingness or inability to stand by his denial of the existence of the contract.
Whether or not the defendant "refers" the oath, it is in the last analysis his own
unwillingness to take the oath, rather than any sworn statement by the plaintiff,
which establishes the fact against the defendant.
93 6 HOLDSWORTr, HISTORY OF ENr.SH LAw 387-389, 392 (1937); PITXCKNETr, A CON-
CiSE MIsToRY OF THE Commox LAW 55-56, 611, 616-617 (4th ed. 1948); Rabel, The
Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History, 63 L. Q. REv. 174 (1947) ; 13 Com
L. Q. 303 (1928) ; Summers, supra note 89.
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proof of a non-existent contract was greater then than now. Equity
courts found ways of preventing the statute from being used to perpe-
trate a fraud in the three instances mentioned above, in each of which
there was proof to the court's satisfaction that a contract had existed.
Of the three, the most convincing, the one with no attendant risk of per-
jured proof of a non-existent contract, was the class of cases in which
the defendant confessed the contract. It is astonishing, therefore; that
this is the only one of the three exceptional instances that has not been
universally perpetuated, and it is more astonishing that the removal of
the temptation to the defendant to perjure himself by denying the
making of an agreement should have been employed as a device for
permitting him unethically to escape an honest obligation.
The Iowa legislature and the courts of some states deserve applause
for the correctness of their attitudes. The law of the United States ought
in all jurisdictions be what it was believed to have been in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. Effect should be given to the defend-
ant's admission of the making of an oral contract. The statute should
not be recognized as a defense except where the defendant can and does
deny the contracting. It should not be permissible to raise the defense
of the statute by demurrer, or by a motion to dismiss the complaint
except where the motion is supported by an affidavit denying the making
of the contract. Greater use should be made, in appropriate cases, of
the principle of estoppel. As the illustrations already given show, much
of this could be accomplished by judicial decision. In jurisdictions where
the contrary views are too firmly buttressed by the doctrine of stare
decisis, there should be corrective legislation. Lord Thurlow's question
can be repeated: "But what will become of the statute?" And his own
answer: "If he [defendant] pleads, he must support his plea by an
answer, denying the parol agreement, the only effect of the statute being
that it shall not be proved aliunde. If he answers and says there was no
parol agreement, I think no evidence that can be given will sustain the
suit.",
94
As Dean Roscoe Pound has said: "Legal concepts sometimes are, and
perhaps sometimes must be, at variance with the requirements of morals.
Yet such a condition is not sdmething of which the jurist is to be proud.
It is not a virtue in the law to have it so."9
94 Whitchurch v. Bevis, 2 Bro. C.C. 559, 566, 567 (Ch. 1789).
05 Poiwn, LAW AND MoRALs 41 (1924).
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